LIBERATION OR OCCUPATION? HOW FAILURE TO APPLY OCCUPATION LAW DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM THREATENED U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS
here is nothing more difficult to carry out, or more doubtful of success, while nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favor; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe anything new until they have had actual experience of it.
Machiavelli
These words written over four hundred years ago to describe the challenges inherent in the administration of a newly acquired territory would have provided wise counsel as U.S.
officials contemplated regime change and the creation of a democratic government in Iraq.
Both allies and enemies objected to the bold proposal to reform Iraq. To respond to these concerns, the United States characterized the proposed military intervention as a humanitarian mission intended to liberate, not occupy, Iraq, and promised that
U.S. forces would remain in Iraq only as long as necessary to destroy Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) and to create a new government. Over a nine-month period, the administration successfully convinced the majority of Americans that military intervention was necessary; obtained Congressional approval for the use of force in Iraq; and rallied a "Coalition of the Willing" to remove Saddam Hussein from power. 4 The United States viewed the support of the Iraqi people as critical to success during combat and in post-war Iraq and avoided during the war actions that might cause the population to view U.S. forces as conquerors, rather than as liberating forces. Thus, as U.S. forces attacked and controlled significant portions of the country, the United States refused to concede that its "liberating" forces would become "occupying forces" as defined by international law.
This position effectively prevented military commanders from aggressively using the authority afforded to an occupying power under international law to control the occupied territory.
Consequently, after Baghdad fell, widespread looting and violence damaged critical infrastructure and greatly complicated coalition efforts to create a democratic government in post-war Iraq.
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This paper considers whether an aggressive use of occupation authority by U.S. forces in Baghdad could have avoided the lawlessness that followed the regime's fall. The paper first reviews "occupation law" (primarily Articles 42-56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and Articles 47-78 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention) and outlines the obligations and rights afforded to occupying forces under international law. The paper then reviews how the United States characterized the use of force as a humanitarian mission to liberate the Iraqi people and explains how this position confused the international community and restricted U.S.
commanders. After summarizing U.S. military actions in Baghdad prior to and following the regime's collapse, the paper considers several areas in which an immediate, aggressive use of occupation authority might have significantly altered events in Baghdad. The paper argues that, in the first crucial days after Baghdad fell, the U.S. lost momentum and initiative because it failed to take aggressive steps to ensure order. Finally, the paper concludes that strategic leaders must understand occupation law and that in future conflicts, the United States must use occupation law to accomplish strategic goals during all phases of military operations.
OCCUPYING POWERS UNDER THE GENEVA AND HAGUE CONVENTIONS
Many senior military and civilian leaders view international law in general (and the Geneva and Hague Conventions in particular), as constraints upon military operations. 6 They interpret the provisions of international law as limiting military discretion and obliging the commander to divert assets and personnel to perform missions unrelated to military objectives. They consider particularly onerous the provisions of occupation law that require an occupying force to ensure order in the occupied territory and to meet the humanitarian needs of the local population.
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In part, this view is valid; the conventions impose significant obligations upon military forces to regulate the vicious, unrestrained combat and destruction so often present in past conflicts. The provisions require commanders to protect entire classes of individuals, including wounded combatants, prisoners of war, displaced civilians, and inhabitants of an occupied
territory. Yet with respect to occupation law, any view that concentrates solely upon the obligations imposed upon the occupier is incomplete, for the conventions grant the occupying force tremendous authority to control an occupied territory, recognizing the need for a strong presence to replace the overthrown government and ensure order. In reality, occupation law is a two-edged sword; it imposes obligations but also provides an effective administrator authority to control the occupied territory.
According to the Geneva and Hague Conventions, occupation law applies when a military occupation exists. A military occupation is an "invasion plus taking firm possession of enemy territory for the purpose of holding it" and exists only when an invading force achieves effective control of a territory; that is, when an invading force has sufficient personnel to control and administer the territory invaded. 8 A military occupation normally occurs when an invading force displaces the existing government, but not every invasion results in a military occupation. It is possible for an invading force to be an occupying force in one portion of an invaded country but not another due to the level of resistance and lack of control exercised. If an invading force pushes rapidly through a large portion of enemy territory without establishing effective control, no occupation occurs. Similarly, raiding parties and reconnaissance detachments, patrols, or even large combat forces quickly moving through an area do not occupy a territory. 9 Whether an invasion results in a military occupation is a question of fact determined by the exact circumstances. 10 If the facts establish effective control, then invading forces become occupying forces and are then obligated to meet international law standards.
OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN OCCUPYING POWER
Occupation law permits an invading force to control an area for the period of occupation.
It does not transfer sovereignty to the occupant; it merely grants some of the rights of the displaced sovereign to the occupying power so that the occupying force can maintain order and administer the territory. 11 Once a force achieves effective control and becomes an occupying power, occupation law imposes (among other requirements) upon the force the obligations to: § Restore and maintain public order;
12 § Respect existing laws;
13 § respect family honor, life, property, and religious practice, and permit spiritual assistance.
14 § Facilitate institutions devoted to the care and education of children; 15 § Ensure the population receives food and medicine and bring in such material if necessary;
16 § Facilitate relief schemes on behalf of the population; 17 and § Maintain hospitals, public health and hygiene services, and allow medical personnel to carry out their duties.
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In addition to the above obligations which require an occupying power to perform certain actions, occupation law also prohibits the occupying power from taking certain actions. For example, the occupying force may not: § Deport protected persons, regardless of motive;
19 § Compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces; 20 § Compel protected persons to work unless they are over eighteen years of age; 21 § Abolish or suspend the rights of the nationals of the hostile party; 22 § Coerce of take action against judges who abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience; 23 or § Use mass punishments.
24
The obligations and limitations listed above establish minimum requirements to ensure basic human rights for the inhabitants of an occupied territory. Yet they only tell part of the story, for the Geneva and Hague Conventions also provide the occupying power significant authority to control the day-to-day affairs of the people within the territory.
AUTHORITY GRANTED TO AN OCCUPYING POWER
The provisions of the Geneva and Hague Conventions pertaining to military occupations grant the occupying force and its personnel immunity from local law unless the occupant expressly provides otherwise. 25 The provisions also permit the occupying force to: § Demand and enforce obedience and to administer the territory. Do whatever is necessary (within limits) to maintain an orderly government and to ensure the security of the occupying power, its forces, and lines of communication;
26 § Administer the territory through a military government or a mixed military/civilian administration; 27 § Require officials and employees of public and private transportation systems and similar services to perform duties not involved in the war effort; 28 § Require the occupied territory to bear reasonable costs related to the occupation; 29 § Modify (with some limitations) the local, provincial, or general government; 30 § Repeal or suspend laws which threaten the occupying force (such as laws relating to recruitment and the bearing of arms) or any legislation inconsistent with the duties of the occupant (such as racial or gender based discriminatory laws); 40 and § Require an oath from officials to perform conscientiously and not to act to the prejudice of the occupying power, and remove any official who declines; and require strict obedience from the official as long as he remains in office.
41
These authorities provide the occupying power tremendous authority over the people in the occupied territory and, in effect, permit the occupying authority to control or exert influence over almost every aspect of life within the territory. Occupation law provides these authorities to an occupying force to enable the force to ensure order in the occupied territory, thereby minimizing risk of harm to civilian inhabitants and existing institutions. 66 Most of these critics assumed that a strict liability standard applied, arguing that because U.S. forces had displaced the regime, the U.S. was automatically obliged to ensure order. 67 In fact, as previously discussed, the obligation to ensure order applied only in areas for which the invading force had effective control. Although U.S. forces occupied key sections of the city and patrolled throughout the city, uniformed Iraqi, This review suggests that application of occupation law might have changed conditions in post-war Baghdad. Yet it is unreasonable to fault commanders, for they were restrained by a U.S. policy designed to limit actions that might appear imperialistic. Clearly, however, had the United States planned for the possible use of occupation law during combat operations, U.S.
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forces would have been better prepared to restore order in Baghdad.
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE FAILURE TO APPLY OCCUPATION LAW
Consideration of this issue suggests important lessons that strategic leaders should incorporate into future operational plans.
First, the United States must ensure that civilian and military leaders at all levels understand the authority and obligations of occupation law. This will ensure that occupation authority is considered by tactical and operational leaders. Additionally, it will eliminate misunderstandings such as the confusion regarding the use of captured enemy money. Fourth, the United States must avoid strategic policies that restrict a commander's authority on the battlefield. Here, a legitimate desire to avoid alienating the Iraqi people led to the reluctance to take actions that might make U.S. forces appear to be conquering forces. This effectively denied commanders the authority to apply occupation law on the battlefield.
Finally, in future conflicts, the United States must plan for "worst-case" post-conflict scenarios. The otherwise brilliant coalition war plan assumed incorrectly that the United States would not need to assert occupation authority until ORHA or the CPA was operational in Iraq.
In effect, this limited planning to a "best-case" scenario and failed to anticipate the lawlessness that followed the regime's fall. Had the United States planned for a worst-case scenario, forces would have arrived in Baghdad better prepared to establish order. ENDNOTES 8 An invading force occupies a territory when it has actual authority and control over the territory. An occupation extends only to the territory where authority has been established and can be exercised. Hague 10 Hague Convention, art 42. Because occupation requires effective control, observers often disagree as to precisely when an occupation begins. 11 The exercise of these rights results from the established power of the occupant and from the necessity of maintaining law and order, indispensable both to the inhabitants and to the occupying force. FM 27-10, 140.
12 Since the authority of the former government has passed into the hands of the occupant, "the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Hague Convention, art. 43. 13 Ibid.
14 Hague Convention, art. 46.
15 Geneva Convention, art. 50. 16 Geneva Convention, art. 55; FM 27-10, 146 (To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.) 17 Geneva Convention, art. 59. 18 Geneva Convention, art. 56. 19 Geneva Convention, art 49. 20 Hague Convention, art. 44; Geneva Convention, art. 51; FM 27-10, 154-56. 21 Hague Convention, art. 23; Geneva Convention, art. 51; and FM 27-10, 410 (prohibition against forcing the inhabitants to take part in military operations against their own country precludes requisitioning their services upon works directly promoting the ends of the war, such as construction of fortifications, entrenchments, and military airfields or the transportation of supplies or ammunition in the zone of operations; but does not prohibit their being employed voluntarily.) See also Geneva Convention, art. 52, which precludes measures aiming at creating unemployment or restricting job opportunities in order to induce individuals to work for the Occupying Power 22 Hague Convention, art. 23; FM 27-10, 143 (It is especially forbidden to declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party.) 23 Geneva Convention, art. 54; FM 27-10, 156 (The Occupying Power may not alter the status of public officials or judges in the occupied territories or sanction them if they abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience. The Occupying Power may remove public officials from their posts if they fail to perform their duties.) 24 Hague Convention art. 50; Geneva Convention, art 33; FM 27-10, 164 (No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.) 25 FM 27-10, 143. Military and civilian personnel of the occupying forces and occupation administration and persons accompanying them are not subject to the local law or to the jurisdiction of the local courts of the occupied territory unless expressly made subject thereto by a competent officer of the occupying forces or occupation administration. 26 Geneva Convention, art. 64; FM 27-10, 158 (It is the duty of the inhabitants to carry on their ordinary peaceful pursuits, to behave in an absolutely peaceful manner, to take no part in hostilities, to refrain from all injurious acts toward the troops or in respect to their operations, and to render strict obedience to the orders of the occupant.) 141. 28 Geneva Convention, art. 54. FM 27-10, 156 (The salaries of civil officials of the hostile government who remain in the occupied territory and continue the work of their offices, such as judges, administrative or police officers, officers of city or communal governments, are paid from the public revenues of the occupied territory.) 29 Geneva Convention, art. 51; FM 27-10, 141.
30 FM 27-10, 142 (The occupant may, while retaining its paramount authority, permit the government of the country to perform some or all of its normal functions.) 31 Hague Convention art. 23; Geneva Convention, arts. 51,64; FM 27-10, 142 (The occupant will continue the ordinary civil and criminal laws of the occupied territory except to the extent it may be authorized to alter, suspend, or repeal such laws. The occupant may alter, repeal, or suspend legislation constituting a threat to its security, such as laws relating to recruitment and the bearing of arms; legislation dealing with political process, such as laws regarding the rights of suffrage and of assembly; and legislation inconsistent with the duties of the occupant, such as laws establishing racial discrimination.) 32 My fellow citizens: At this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger. . . . We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faith they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people. Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them. If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near. what we do know is that we have responsibilities as a force that has entered. The specific references to occupying power are very precise and very legalistic, and I'm not really in the best position to be able to give you information on that. We'll give you some more as time goes on as it relates to that specific concern….Right now we're still a liberating force, and that's how we're approaching our operations….Whether that changes over time needs to be seen.
BG Brooks' comments reflect the difficulty in determining when a force has effective control of territory. During asymmetric combat as occurred in Iraq, with units moving long distances, bypassing enemy formations and cities, it was difficult to determine when the force achieved effective control of an area and met the legal definition of an occupying force. What we must all hope is that a new era of human rights in Iraq will now begin, with the end of the war. And here, in the first instance, I hope the Coalition will set an example by making clear that they intend to act strictly within the rules set down by the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, and by demonstrating through their actions that they accept the responsibilities of the Occupying Power for public order and safety, and the well-being of the civilian population. We find it -at best -odd that the Secretary General chose to bring this to our attention. The US has said that it has not yet established whether it is the occupying power under international law, but is nevertheless respecting the rules….We are simply saying that the issue of an occupying power has not yet been dealt with. Once again the situation is still quite fluid. We will come to that, and presumably come to it quickly. But there should be no question --certainly no question in the mind of the Secretary General --that we need to make any clearer than we already have, and have been on the record repeatedly as being in conformance and wanting to be in conformance in every way with the Geneva Conventions. 85 FM 27-10, 138. 86 A proclamation of occupation would silence critics who contended that the United States was avoiding its obligations as an occupying power and not doing enough to ensure order in Iraq. A proclamation and aggressive efforts to restore order in Baghdad might also have aided U.S. efforts to obtain international financial support for Iraqi reconstruction. Ironically, the U.S. would have been largely immune from later criticism if it took aggressive action, exactly the reverse of the situation at the start of the war. The down side to such an action would be small; even if the use of occupation law failed to help keep order. An Iraqi literally said to me --in May, when I got there --an ordinary guy on the street in a Shia neighborhood, said to me, "Who is the government. . . . And I said to him, "What do you mean 'Who' is the government?" He said, "You know, who is the government?" After 30 years of dictatorship, I suppose that's how you phrase it. . . . So, I finally said to him, "Oh, Ambassador Bremer is the government." He said, "Oh, okay, as long as someone is in charge. 88 Few Americans understood how Iraqis could lament Saddam's departure only weeks after they obtained their freedom. However, as the Iraqis faced the disorder and inconveniences of post war Baghdad, they may well have remembered the ancient Arab proverb: "Better 60 years of tyranny than one day of anarchy." Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, (New York, 1989) . 89 If electrical utility workers had returned to the electrical substations or power generation facilities, it is unlikely that they would have restored power. Yet their very presence at the city's electrical substations and other facilities would have provided additional security for the facilities. 92 International law recognizes that a force may seize and use the property of the opposing state. Within a few weeks, the issue was resolved and higher commands authorized use of the
